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1 Introduction
A cornerstone of the world trading system is the idea, represented in several articles of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), that developing countries should
receive “special and differential treatment.” Such a special treatment comes in many forms,
but is most visible in the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Those preferences
have been firmly in place since the early 1970s, and apply over a sizeable share of the
exports from developing economies. Currently, all industrialized nations have a GSP
program. It is also common to have more privileged preference programs, sometimes
restricted to Least Developed Countries (LDCs), sometimes limited to developing nations
from a specific region. More recently, even some emerging economies have put in place their
own GSPs. For brevity, we call the programs of nonreciprocal trade preferences collectively
by nonreciprocal trade preferences, or NRTPs ; currently, there are 27 of them in force.1
The formal goal of NRTPs is to foster economic growth in developing economies. Yet,
despite the longevity of the system and its potential importance for developing countries
and for the multilateral trading system more generally, the empirical evidence on the
effectiveness of nonreciprocal preferences is lacking in many ways. In fact, we do not have
even a clear picture of their effects on aggregate exports. Some authors argue that NRTPs
have a large and positive effect on the exports of beneficiaries. Others indicate that they
have a large but negative effect. Some studies point instead to ambiguous effects. This is
troubling, because if we hope to assess the effectiveness of nonreciprocal trade preferences
in promoting economic growth, we need to know at least their effects on beneficiaries’
exports. Since the United States is currently tightening the enforcement of eligibility
criteria for recipients of its NRTPs, such an assessment seems particularly timely.2
In this short paper, we aim to fill this gap. Using data between 1950 and 2015, we
establish some key facts about the aggregate trade effects of NRTPs employing a standard
but theoretically consistent gravity equation framework. At least as importantly, we use a
recent, carefully constructed dataset put together by Scott Baier and Jeffrey Bergstrand,
1See Ornelas (2016) for a detailed discussion of the institutional setting of GSP and of other forms
of the special and differential treatment offered to developing countries in the world trading system, and
Zissimos (2018) for a collection of articles discussing the various roles of the World Trade Organization in
economic development.
2As U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer recently indicated, “President Trump has sent a
clear message that the United States will vigorously enforce eligibility criteria for preferential access to
the U.S. market. Beneficiary countries choose to either work with USTR to meet trade preference eli-
gibility criteria or face enforcement actions” (https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2017/december/trump-administration-enforces).
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which to our knowledge has not been used to scrutinize the effects of NRTPs yet.
In line with the received literature, we find that NRTPs do not have a clear effect on the
average exports of beneficiary countries. They do promote exports of LDC beneficiaries—
but only if they are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In that case,
NRTPs increase trade significantly. In contrast, other developing economies that receive
nonreciprocal preferences are also able to increase exports, but only if they are not WTO
members. For all others, the average export effects of NRTPs are essentially mute. Those
findings are robust to different econometric specifications and different trade agreement
definitions, and are observed across most of the decades covered in our dataset.
Hence, the upshot of our analysis is that we need to allow for heterogeneity to un-
derstand the effects of NRTPs, as they are effective in promoting aggregate exports of
beneficiary countries only under some circumstances. In particular, the results point to
interesting linkages between the export benefits from participation in the WTO (where
tariff concessions are negotiated multilaterally and are nondiscriminatory) and the bene-
fits from nonreciprocal, preferential tariff concessions. For some types of economies, they
are complementary to each other; for others, they are substitutes.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the reasons leading to such a stark
heterogeneity, but our findings can be rationalized. For non-LDCs, the results are intuitive.
Nonreciprocal preferences help if the country does not have secure access to developed mar-
kets through (generally low) MFN tariffs; once they do, the extra market access through
(revocable and therefore insecure) NRTPs become less important.3 For LDCs, on the other
hand, NRTPs complement the market access gains that they accrue from participating in
the WTO. That result is less immediate. Yet an important factor behind the ineffective-
ness of NRTPs for very poor countries that are not WTO members may be the difficulties
those countries face in accessing world markets due to both lacking infrastructure and dis-
torted incentives. Once they become members of the WTO, an event that usually prompts
(and is prompted by) other institutional reforms, resources can more easily flow to com-
parative advantage sectors, allowing them to effectively take advantage of the preferences.
We provide suggestive evidence that, indeed, institutions (as proxied, for example, by a
democracy index) are central to explain the effectiveness of NRTPs for LDCs.
Now, it is important to stress that, even if we were absolutely sure that NRTPs boosted
3Carnegie (2013) shows that WTO rules weaken the leverage that larger economies have over smaller
ones once they becomes members. As a result, the ‘donor’ countries tend to make the threat of GSP
revocation more salient to achieve international political goals. Such increased insecurity of GSP eligibility
could also help to explain this finding.
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exports for some groups of countries, this would constitute an important but only the first
element in a thorough assessment of the desirability of NRTPs. For starters, the theoretical
basis for NRTPs is shaky (see, e.g., Bagwell and Staiger, 2014). In particular, they stand
in stark contrast with the principles of reciprocity (the preferences are unilateral) and of
nondiscrimination (they discriminate across sources of imports by design), the two main
pillars of the world trading system (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999, 2002). Furthermore, because
preferences are given and taken at the discretion of the “donor” countries, the continuity
of the improved market access is uncertain. But as Limao (2016) makes clear, such trade
policy uncertainty can undermine the effectiveness of preferential market access.
1.1 Related Literature
We build on a broad literature that estimates ex-post trade effects of trade agreements on
aggregate bilateral imports using a gravity equation.4 Even though NRTPs have been a
staple of the world trading system since the 1970s, there are surprisingly few papers whose
primary goal is to study NRTPs. However, the literature concerned with the trade effects
of WTO membership has always included in its empirical specifications controls for GSP
status. Hence, a large part of research on the trade effects of NRTPs can be viewed as
an “incidental literature,” whose main concern lies elsewhere. Put together, results are all
over, depending on the empirical specification and the dataset used.5
Rose (2004), Subramanian and Wei (2007) and Liu (2009) are some of the main stud-
ies that estimate the trade effect of GSP as a by-product of their analyses of the WTO
trade effect. By itself, this is not a problem. However, the main drawbacks in their anal-
yses are the use of average trade as the dependent variable (Rose)—according to Baldwin
and Taglioni (2006), this corresponds to the “silver medal mistake,” which is especially
problematic in one-way trade arrangements—the lack of proper control for multilateral re-
sistance (both Rose and Liu), as proposed by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), and the
absence of control for time-invariant country-pair heterogeneity (Subramanian and Wei).
As Head and Mayer (2014) make clear, all of that matters. Furthermore, Rose codes GSP
as a bilateral variable, but by definition it represents unilateral trade preferences.
4See Limao (2016) for a recent and insightful review of the branch of that literature dealing with
reciprocal preferences in the context of preferential trade agreements.
5We direct the reader to Ornelas (2016, section 4.2) for a more detailed discussion of this literature
and its controversial and diverse results. Here we only highlight what we believe are the main sources of
disagreement about the results. Ornelas (2016) does not, however, discuss the problems arising from the
different sources of data on NRTPs used in the literature, one of our emphases here.
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In terms of results, Rose (2004) and Subramanian and Wei (2007) find very large
positive trade effects for GSP, although Subramanian and Wei obtain contrasting results
when disaggregating by main sector of activity. Chang and Lee (2011) reach the same
conclusion using non-parametric methods, but recognizing that their framework is not
well suited to control for endogenous multilateral resistance terms. On the other hand, Liu
(2009) obtains mixed results, which vary with the specification.
Herz and Wagner (2011) and Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) do place NRTPs at the center
of their analysis. Eicher and Henn (2011) also discuss the effects of NRTPs, although
their main goal is to estimate the trade effect of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs),
individually and as a whole. Herz and Wagner do not control for multilateral resistance,
but Eicher and Henn and Gil-Pareja et al. do. All of them include country-pair fixed
effects.6
Now, a problem with those papers, as well as with the preceding incidental literature,
is the source of data on GSP and other NRTPs. Take for example Eicher and Henn (2011).
They use the data for GSP from Subramanian and Wei (2007), who in turn use Rose’s
(2004) data. But Rose simply uses UNCTAD’s reports in 1974, 1979 and 1984, therefore
disregarding all subsequent changes in GSP. Furthermore, Eicher and Henn only code
GSP from 1979 onwards, although the European GSP program started in 1971 and the
American in 1976. In turn, Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) use UNCTAD’s reports in 2001, 2005,
2006 and 2008. For previous years, they rely on Herz and Wagner’s (2011) data, which
Herz and Wagner credit to the UNCTAD but without giving further details. Liu (2009)
is particularly careful about his GSP coding, sourcing from all available UNCTAD reports
up to 2003, the last year in his dataset. A problem remains, however, for the several years
when there is no UNCTAD report, since changes in GSP membership typically happen at
a higher frequency. The standard solution in the literature has been to simply interpolate
data from the nearest available years, but this is obviously unsatisfactory. Finally, of all
the papers mentioned above, only Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) are especially careful with the
coding of non-GSP NRTPs, which they obtain from the agreements’ websites. Nonetheless,
they individually code only five of such arrangements, whereas twenty two of them were
in force in the last year of their dataset.
6Gil-Pareja et al. (2017) use the same dataset as Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) to study instead how NRTPs
affect the exports of the countries offering the preferences to those receiving them. They find sizeable and
statistically significant positive effects in their OLS specification with country-year and country-pair fixed
effects. They rationalize their findings by arguing that nonreciprocal preferences usually have additional
requirements, such as enforcement of intellectual property rights and rules of origin, which could have a
positive trade effect for the countries offering the preferences.
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Those differences about the sources of information on NRTPs would matter little if
estimates were very stable across studies. They are not. For example, Eicher and Henn
(2011) find that GSP trade effects are large, negative and significant. This is also the main
conclusion of Herz and Wagner (2011). In contrast, Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) obtain the
opposite result (although not for all NRTPs), more in line with the incidental findings from
the WTO-trade-effect literature. Overall, the magnitude and the statistical significance of
the results vary tremendously across studies, and sometimes even within studies, making
it difficult to establish the main facts about the aggregate effects of NRTPs.
There is also a valuable but still small literature that estimates the trade effects of
specific nonreciprocal trade preferences using product-level bilateral trade data. Frazer and
Van Biesebroeck (2010) study the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); Thelle et
al. (2015) analyze the effects of all European NRTPs. Both studies find that nonreciprocal
preferences promote the exports of recipient countries. In line with our results, Thelle
et al. (2015) find effects that are twice as large for LDCs. Hakobyan (2017a, 2017b)
uses a similar disaggregated approach to study the American GSP program, exploiting
periods in which the program had expired (to be later reinstated) and the suspension
of some country-product pairs from the program after exports to the U.S. increased “too
much.” In both cases, she finds evidence that the program promotes the exports of recipient
countries, although the effects using the first approach are rather modest. Gnutzmann
and Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan (2017) study the E.U.’s withdrawal of GSP preferences from
Belarus in 2007 and find negative effects for (4-digit) products directly affected, but no
aggregate trade effect. In recent work, Garred and Kwon (2017) study the effects of the
expansion of unilateral preferences in OECD economies to LDCs since the late 1990s. They
find small positive effects at the extensive margin (by country pair and product), which
are present only when a beneficiary country already exported the product elsewhere or
exported other products to the preference-granting market.
Our analysis differs from those lines of research because here the aim is to investigate
NRTPs as a global trade policy alternative. We recognize that disaggregated data can
allow for more precise identification. In fact, as Ornelas (2016) points out, determining
causality and identifying underlying mechanisms will be possible only once the literature
moves to firm-level analysis and exploits reasonably exogenous trade shocks.7 Nevertheless,
7To our knowledge, there are only two ongoing attempts at that. Albornoz et al. (2018) study the
American GSP exploiting a partial suspension of Argentina’s preferences starting in 1997. They find that
the preferences promote exports, although the effect is almost entirely driven by the extensive margin. Teti
(2018) also finds positive effects for Peruvian firms due to the Andean Trade Preferences Act, a program
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understanding the impact of nonreciprocal preferences on aggregate trade flows is a critical
initial step before we can move in that direction and towards quantification of their welfare
and efficiency properties. We seek to provide that first step here.
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss the data in the next section and the
empirical strategy in section 3. In section 4 we show our results and conclude in section 5.
2 Data
We have an unbalanced panel with nearly 1.5 million observations, where the main variable
is annual bilateral aggregate imports obtained from the 3.0 version of the Correlates of War
database, which covers trade from 1950 to 2009.8 We complete the dataset with import
data from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics until 2015.9 There are around 200
importers and exporters, generating a total of 18,743 country pairs.10
Three policy variables describe WTO, PTA and NRTP participation. Data for WTO
membership until 2001 come from Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers (2007a); from 2002 onwards,
we rely on the WTO website. Tomz et al. use a broad definition of WTO membership
that allows for de jure, colonial, de facto and provisional members. This lends itself more
naturally to the estimation of NRTP trade effects, as WTO nonmember participants are
often NRTP-eligible developing nations that face MFN tariffs just as regular members.
For PTA and NRTP memberships, we rely on the extensive dataset put together by
Scott Baier and Jeffrey Bergstrand, available at http://www.nd.edu/jbergstr/, and first
used by Baier et al. (2014). The following countries offer preferences under GSP or other
types of NRTPs in at least part of the sample period: Australia, Belarus, Canada, Chile,
China, members of the European Union,11 Iceland, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Morocco, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand,
Turkey and the United States.
To the best of our knowledge, the trade agreements dataset compiled by Baier and
Bergstrand is, by far, the most complete and accurate available. For PTAs, there are other
that gives better access to the American market for firms from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.
8http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/bilateral-trade. See Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins (2009) for
a description of the data.
9http://data.imf.org/?sk=9D6028D4-F14A-464C-A2F2-59B2CD424B85. Data downloaded on Septem-
ber 28, 2016.
10Correlates of War data come mainly from the IMF Directions of Trade Statistics. Nonetheless, the
first is preferable for the earlier period because it largely solves problems in the IMF data, as for example
multiple names and spellings for the same country. See the dataset codebook for more details.
11In many cases, E.U. members also offered non-reciprocal preferences before joining the single market.
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reliable and relatively complete sources.12 For NRTPs, in contrast, most of the sources
used in the literature are incomplete and/or inconsistent with each other. For current
membership, the WTO does provide a complete and detailed list (http://ptadb.wto.org/),
but not for historical membership information. For data up to 2003, the best alternative
has been Liu’s (2009) codification (available at http://ksuweb.kennesaw.edu/ xliu6/). He
draws from all information available directly from UNCTAD’s (several years) reports on
GSP. However, as mentioned in the introduction, those reports are not published regularly.
Sometimes they are published in consecutive years, but during some periods it takes several
years before a new report is released. In contrast, the Baier-Bergstrand dataset draws
mostly from primary sources, and provides a link to the original treaty whenever there is
a change in status. Thus, we believe that the Baier-Bergstrand dataset largely solves this
fundamental difficulty for the estimation of the trade effects of NRTPs. As our trade data
goes until 2015, we update the Baier-Bergstrand data up to that year. We use original
documents from the WTO’s PTA database to account for changes in (or the creation
of) GSP programs of the following countries: Canada, members of the E.U., Norway,
Switzerland and the United States.13
In addition, we collect information on twenty seven individual arrangements that of-
fer better-than-GSP preferences. The majority of those schemes was created after the
2000’s and many of them coexist with the ordinary GSP programs. They fall into three
categories: i) expansions of already existing GSPs with additional preferences often given
to LDCs; ii) new non-GSP, LDC-exclusive programs; and iii) preferences to a distinct
subset of countries, usually with a limited regional reach. The countries offering such pro-
grams are Australia, Canada, Chile, China, members of the E.U., Iceland, India, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Thailand,
Taiwan, Turkey and the U.S. Table A1 in the Appendix lists all programs and their starting
dates.14
For the definition of Least Developed Countries, which we use to identify heterogeneous
12For example, De Sousa (2012, data available at http://jdesousa.univ.free.fr/data.htm) and the WTO
itself (http://rtais.wto.org).
13We also update some information in the Baier-Bergstrand dataset related to unrecorded withdrawals
of GSP preferences. Portugal and Spain receiving GSP benefits after 2000 is a clear example. We do so
whenever we find solid evidence for the withdrawals.
14Data on GSP-LDC and LDC-specific schemes is available at the WTO’s PTA database. Information on
AGOA and CBI is available at the programs’ websites (https://www.trade.gov/agoa/eligibility/index.asp
and https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/caribbean-basin-initiative-cbi).
We do not consider short, temporary suspensions from better-than-GSP programs, both because they are
not widespread and, especially, because of their temporary nature.
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effects, we follow the United Nations’ list of membership and graduations.15 Notice that
LDC is a formal denomination given to very poor nations created by the UN using criteria
of social development and economic vulnerability.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how our dependent variable, bilateral annual imports, varies
over time within nonreciprocal trade arrangements.16 Figure 1 displays the share of imports
coming from NRTP beneficiaries when the importer is the United States, the European
Union and other “donor” countries.17 One visible common pattern emerges: after a sharp
increase in the share of imports from NRTP beneficiaries in the first half of the 1970s (as
the main powers implemented their GSPs), a period of steady decline ensued.18
There are large and abrupt falls and surges in all import shares. They vary either
because of changes in import volumes or in the composition of the beneficiaries’ list. Ad-
justments in the latter are revealing of the design of NRTPs and illustrate one of the main
sources of variation in the data beyond NRTP creation: changes in the identity of benefi-
ciaries due to either the formation of “deeper,” reciprocal trade agreements or to reforms of
the program. Consider the share of U.S. imports from NRTP beneficiaries. It falls over 10
percentage points from 1987 to 1988, when GSP status was removed at once from Bahrain,
Bermuda, Brunei Darussalam, Nauru, Hong Kong, South Korea, Panama, Singapore and
Taiwan, and by 6 percentage points from 1993 to 1994, when the U.S. granted Mexico
wider and deeper preferences under the North American Free Trade Agreement. Similar
cases are observed after 2009, with the signature of the U.S.-Peru and U.S.-Colombia FTAs
in 2009 and 2012, respectively, and with the suspension of Argentina’s benefits in 2012.
In more recent years, donor countries have modified their NRTPs in order to prioritize
preferences for poorer nations, notably LDCs. This is the case of a recent revision of the
European GSP program in 2014 that lowered the E.U. total import share from NRTP
15The current list of LDCs and the timeline of countries’ graduation are available at
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/ldc-graduation.html.
16Notice that NRTPs do not necessarily cover all exports of a beneficiary to a “donor” country. In fact,
there is much discretion with regard to the depth and width of benefits (see Ornelas, 2016, section 2.1 for
a detailed discussion). Shares in figures 1 and 2 are, thus, an upper bound on the trade flows actually
enjoying nonreciprocal preferences.
17The definition of “European Union” changes according to the membership of the bloc, from its original
composition of six countries to its current twenty eight members. For the “Others” series, we use a weighted
average of shares of imports coming from NRTP beneficiaries across other countries offering nonreciprocal
preferences, using as weights the share of the country in the rest of the world’s total imports.
18Positive import shares before 1970 refer to the French Empire System of Preferences and to an arrange-
ment between six European countries and selected African states (Yaounde´ Convention). In that period,
the Baier-Bergstrand database also classifies the Commonwealth PTA between the United Kingdom and
its current and former colonies as an NRTP arrangement based on a 1932 document. We do not take the
latter into account due to scarce documentation.
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Figure 1: Share of Imports coming from NRTP beneficiaries
beneficiaries by 4 percentage points. The list of eligible countries shrank, large exporters
like Argentina, Brazil and Russia lost preferential access, whereas better access was given
to those “most in need.”
Figure 2 shows instead the proportion of exports of non-LDC developing countries and
of LDCs to NRTP donor countries in their overall foreign sales.19 A comparison between
the two figures makes clear that the preferences tend to be much more meaningful for the
countries receiving than for the countries offering them. Now, although again there are
multiple reasons for shifts in shares, there is a clear underlying pattern over time. After a
sharp increase in the 1970s, when the main NRTP programs were introduced, the shares
remained roughly unchanged until around 1990. Since then, the shares have declined
steadily for non-LDC beneficiaries, reaching less than 20% in recent years. The general
pattern is not very different for LDC countries until 2010, although for them exports
to countries offering NRTPs are more important and the decline starting in 1990 is less
acute. In 2010, however, their NRTP export shares jumped around 30 percentage points,
due mostly to the creation of China’s Duty-Free Treatment for LDCs that year. Since
19The definition of developing countries is taken from the World Bank.
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Figure 2: Export Shares to Markets Offering NRTPs
then, the shares of LDC beneficiaries returned to a declining trend, reaching around 60%
in 2015.
Following most of the literature, we describe participation in different types of trade
agreements using dummy variables. Let m be the importer, x the exporter and t the
year. Specifically, PTAmxt = 1 if m and x are members of the same PTA at t and 0
otherwise, and WTOmxt = 1 if m and x are both WTO members at t and 0 otherwise.
In turn, NRTPmxt = 1 if m offers trade preferences to x through a nonreciprocal trade
arrangement at t and 0 otherwise. Observe that, unlike the PTA and WTO dummies,
which are bilateral, the NRTP variable is unilateral, as it corresponds to nonreciprocal
concessions.
The Baier-Bergstrand database codes trade agreements depending on the level of eco-
nomic integration. In their taxonomy, which ranges from 1 to 6 in a mutually exclusive
way, 1 is assigned to Nonreciprocal Preferential Trade Agreements; 2 to Preferential Trade
Arrangements; 3 to Free Trade Areas; 4 to Custom Unions; 5 to Common Markets; and 6
to Economic Unions. Our NRTP variable corresponds to arrangements coded as 1 in the
Baier-Bergstrand database, whereas our PTA variable incorporates those coded from 2 to
10
6. The NRTP and PTA variables are, therefore, mutually exclusive.
To provide a clearer sense of the ‘within’ variation that we exploit in our estimations,
Table 1 describes the changes over time of the trade agreement variables across country
pairs following the description above. For example, if the WTO dummy regarding countries
m and x is 0 until 1965 and 1 from that year onwards, the cell under column “WTO/entry”
and row “1960s” has an increment of one. The same procedure applies to the cells under
columns “PTA” and “NRTP” (entry). For the columns under the “exit” label, we apply
the same procedure but for negative changes. Variation in membership is of course crucial
to provide power to the estimations. While those changes are not uniform through time,
there are meaningful changes in all decades.
Table 1: Changes in main variables
Decade NRTP WTO PTA
Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit
1950’s 1 0 1,314 614 124 0
1960’s 129 0 2,343 192 191 30
1970’s 2,236 50 1,160 234 566 0
1980’s 579 152 1,369 0 422 2
1990’s 522 225 4,461 2,104 1,322 157
2000’s 2,476 2,096 5,663 0 3,438 68
Note: The figures in the last row include changes from 2000 to 2015.
As indicated in the column “NRTP/entry,” some pre-GSP nonreciprocal arrangements
already existed before the 1970’s. At that time, European countries granted trade pref-
erences to their overseas recently independent ex-colonies.20 In the 1970’s, concession
of unidirectional preferences became widespread, going beyond former colonial ties. The
number of NRTPs soared as special and differential benefits for developing countries be-
came compatible with obligations under the GATT. In the 2000’s, the E.U. enlargement
led to a similarly massive growth in NRTPs, as new E.U. members automatically adopted
previously existing trade policy responsibilities under the European GSP.
The number of nonreciprocal arrangements that have been reversed also spiked recently.
As showed in the column “NRTP/exit,” after evolving in a steady but mild pace, exits were
much more prevalent in the 2000’s than in previous decades. Around half of those exits
are consequences of reciprocal liberalization. There are not only newly-minted reciprocal
agreements between former NRTP donor and beneficiaries, but also newcomers to ongoing
20The only count under “NRTP/entry” in the 1950’s is due to benefits to Cambodia under the French
Empire System of Preferences. In the 1960’s, counts relate to 18 new African territories receiving trade
benefits from former European metropoles inside the Yaounde´ Convention.
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PTAs replacing previous GSP relationships. An example of the former is the PTA between
the U.S., Dominican Republic and other Central American countries in 2006. An example
of the latter is Bulgaria’s removal of Lebanon’s GSP status and concession of preferential
treatment under the E.U.-Lebanon PTA after Bulgaria’s accession in 2007. The remaining
exits are chiefly due to the revision of the European GSP in 2014, when several middle-
income countries lost preferential access to the E.U.
Table 1 also shows some seemingly unusual exits from the GATT/WTO in the 1990’s.
They relate mainly to newly independent territories, which used to receive membership
benefits as colonial possessions of contracting parties. Ex-colonies had three options when
updating their ties to the GATT. First, become a contracting party themselves using either
the same terms and conditions negotiated by the metropole on their behalf or bargaining
new ones.21 Second, take additional limited time to plan future trade policies and in the
meantime let GATT’s de facto obligations carry out trade relationships. Third, quit the
GATT. Exits from the GATT/WTO relate to the last two options. Their high frequency
during the 1990’s owns to the then newly created WTO, which no longer allowed for
de facto membership and required countries to either accede to the organization or lose
benefits.22
PTA exits are rare, and happened mainly among former USSR provinces or under very
specific situations, like the suspension of the Syria-Turkey PTA in 2011 in the context
of the Syrian civil war. In the Appendix we disentangle further the changes indicated in
Table 1 to better explain the sources of variation in our main independent variables.
Finally, there is a large share of observations with zero trade flows (44% of the sample).
This is a well-known pattern in the trade gravity literature. Interestingly, as Table 2
shows, there is a significant number of zero-trade-flow observations even when countries
are linked through a trade agreement. In particular, there are no trade flows in 18% of the
observations in which countries receive NRTPs. This should not come as a total surprise,
since eligibility often follows (inverse) development status criteria. Still, it is an important
fact to take into account in the estimations. Observe also that the zeros are especially
prevalent when one country is an LDC, but are present even between non-LDC countries.
21Via Article XXVI:5(c) or Article XXXIII, respectively.
22See Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers (2007b) for a more comprehensive discussion of nonmember de facto
participation in the GATT/WTO.
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Table 2: Observations with zero trade flows
Variable Var.=1|Imports=0 Variable=1 I/II
(I) (II)
NRTP 26,166 142,194 18%
WTO 339,436 888,565 38%
PTA 14,060 109,369 13%
NRTP×WTO 18,598 105,972 18%
PTA×WTO 8,508 85,173 10%
NRTP×LDC 13,997 48,769 29%
WTO×LDC 69,810 133,006 52%
PTA×LDC 7,189 17,963 40%
NRTP×WTO×LDC 9,116 33,721 27%
PTA×WTO×LDC 3,750 11,735 32%
Other Statistics # Observations % of Sample
No Trade Preferences & Imports=0 307,782 20%
Total of Zero Trade Flows 660,338 44%
3 Empirical Strategy
We estimate a structural gravity equation following Head and Mayer (2014). It relates
imports by country m from country x in year t to trade agreement variables PTAmxt,
WTOmxt and NRTPmxt and theory-consistent gravity controls.
The empirical model contains importer and exporter time-varying fixed effects. Those
fixed effects control for the endogenous “multilateral resistance” suggested by Anderson
and Van Wincoop (2003) in a panel context, as proposed by Baier and Bergstrand (2007).
Furthermore, we include (time-invariant) country-pair fixed effects to account for unob-
served bilateral heterogeneity and minimize the endogeneity of trade agreements, as first
suggested by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007).
The country-pair fixed effects imply that we are estimating the “within” effect, or
13
how the formation (or the dissolution) of an NRTP affects the imports of the country
granting the preferences from the country receiving them. Collectively, the three sets of
fixed-effects entail a triple-difference strategy. It first compares donors and beneficiaries’
average trade levels inside and outside NRTPs’ life-span. It then subtracts simultaneous
average growth of imports of donors and exports of beneficiaries with respect to third-
countries. As indicated in section 1.1, only recently authors have started to use the full
set of fixed effects to control for multilateral resistance and for unobserved heterogeneity
when estimating the trade effects of NRTPs. As Head and Mayer (2014) demonstrate, such
omissions can matter significantly in the estimation of the impact of trade policy variables.
For NRTPs in particular, together with the data problems discussed earlier, this has been
an important source of the conflicting estimates in the literature.
Observe that most of the usual controls included in gravity estimations (such as GDP,
distance, colonial status and common language) are either country-specific or time-invariant.
Consequently, their impacts are absorbed into the fixed effects. Since they are not of par-
ticular interest here, it is preferable to use the large set of fixed effects just described to
control for all observable and unobservable trade costs in their respective dimensions.
While there are concerns about bilateral bias in the estimation of PTA trade effects, our
set of fixed effects is able to neutralize important potential sources of endogeneity affecting
NRTP estimates. As pointed out by Baier and Bergstrand (2007), selection into PTAs
may be correlated with bilateral trade volumes. So far, the existing literature has relied on
country-pair fixed effects to alleviate those potential endogeneity issues, but it cannot take
into account biases stemming from a time-varying dimension.23 Selection into NRTPs,
by contrast, typically reflects donors’ unilateral decisions to start a general program of
preferences whose list of beneficiaries tends to follow an income criterion. Sources of
potential unilateral or bilateral biases are, thus, reasonably attenuated by our large set of
fixed effects.24
Altogether, our benchmark specification is given by
Mmxt = exp(β1NRTPmxt + β2WTOmxt + β3PTAmxt + γmt + φxt + αmx) + mxt, (1)
where Mmxt are imports; NRTPmxt, WTOmxt and PTAmxt are the trade agreement dum-
23See Limao (2016, section 3.2) for a thorough discussion of this topic.
24In some GSPs, like the American, eligible countries need to request entry in the program. While this
may raise concerns about selection, the vast majority of eligible countries do request entry, so in practice
selection is not a particularly worrying issue.
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mies discussed above; γmt and φxt are the importer and exporter time-varying fixed effects,
respectively; αmx is the country-pair fixed effect; and mxt is an error term.
We estimate this gravity equation with high-dimensional fixed effects using both PPML
and OLS.25 There are considerable differences between the two estimation procedures, as
showed by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Besides heteroskedasticity issues, a key dif-
ference is the inclusion of zero trade flows in the PPML regression, but not in the OLS
specification. This matters because, as showed in Table 2, NRTPs between countries that
do not trade with each other are common. For that reason, we focus on the PPML spec-
ification, but report results with an OLS specification and, for comparison purposes, also
with PPML but with the sample used in the OLS specification (i.e., excluding observations
with zero trade flows). We correct standard errors by allowing shocks to have a pattern of
interdependence across country-pairs, i.e., there are clusters for different combinations of
importers and exporters.
As discussed above, a central ingredient of our analysis is the distinction between
the effects of NRTPs for LDCs and other beneficiary countries. Given the differences in
economic structure, the same preferences may have distinct consequences for the exports of
LDCs and of other developing economies. But often the scope and depth of preferences are
also different. For example, all the main GSP donor countries currently have one or more
sub-schemes in which better market access is offered, e.g. the U.S.’s AGOA and the E.U.’s
Everything but Arms. Those sub-schemes often include LDCs as beneficiaries, although
in general being an LDC is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for eligibility
into those better-than-GSP programs. In fact, currently all LDCs have better-than-GSP
treatment in the American and European markets.
We capture the differential effects for LDCs by interacting all the trade policy variables
with an LDCxt dummy, which is unity if the exporter country x is formally defined as an
LDC in year t. To investigate whether potential differential effects for LDCs are due to
their LDC status (and everything that encompasses) or to especially generous preferences,
in some specifications we interact a dummy that captures only better-than-GSP preferences
with the other trade policy indicators.
We carry out the analysis at the year level. This contrasts with a sizable share of
the literature, which uses data every four or five years. Since the changes in the main
independent variables are codified annually, we believe it is more appropriate to keep the
25For the PPML estimation, we employ the ppml panel sg Stata command used by Larch et al. (2017).
For the OLS estimation, we follow the methodology developed by Guimaraes and Portugal (2010).
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analysis at the same time horizon.
4 Results
4.1 Benchmark
Table 3 shows the benchmark results for the impact of NRTPs on country-pair trade flows,
controlling for WTO and PTA membership and including the large set of fixed effects
discussed above. They vary significantly across econometric specifications. NRTPs have
either a small positive average effect on trade flows (OLS), zero average impact (PPML
with OLS sample) or negative (PPML with full sample). Such instability of the NRTP
coefficient may be disconcerting but is not surprising; in fact, it is consistent with the
conflicting findings in the literature.
Table 3: Average Trade Policy Effects
OLS PPML† PPML
(1) (2) (3)
NRTP 0.081*** 0.005 -0.034*
(0.027) (0.019) (0.019)
WTO 0.098** 0.191** 0.165**
(0.040) (0.079) (0.079)
PTA 0.496*** 0.399*** 0.386***
(0.026) (0.021) (0.020)
Observations 852,052 852,052 1,431,430
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively. † : PPML regression with same
sample used in OLS regression. All regressions include
importer and exporter time-varying fixed effects and
symmetric country-pair fixed effects. Standard errors
are symmetrically clustered by country-pairs.
The estimates of the WTO trade effect are large, statistically significant and robust
across specifications. The PTA trade effect follows the same pattern, but with a much
larger magnitude. Size and statistical significance of PTA estimates are in line with the
received literature, as summarized by Head and Mayer (2014) and Limao (2016). Observe
also, comparing columns 2 and 3, that disregarding the zero-trade-flow observations tends
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to overestimate the trade effects of all types of trade agreements, as it neglects all cases
when a trade policy link is formed but trade remains absent—and such cases are not
uncommon. That neglect is especially critical for the estimation of the NRTP coefficient.
Now, a concern about our methodology, which also affects most of the related litera-
ture, is that changes in trade flows may induce the concession of NRTPs. For example,
preferences may be offered to a country when imports from that country are rising. Or in-
stead, preferences may be suspended if preferential imports from a beneficiary rise too fast.
Naturally, such endogeneity of our key trade policy variable would affect the estimation of
its effects.
Ideally, one would like to have truly exogenous variation in the concession of NRTPs,
or appropriate instruments for them. To our knowledge, such indisputable exogenous
variation for the estimation of the effects of trade agreements (of any kind) has not been
found yet. We can, nevertheless, investigate whether there are clear signs of changes in
bilateral trade flows just before concessions are offered or withdrawn, to infer the potential
importance of endogenous motives behind them.
Figure 3 plots the results from a set of PPML regressions investigating those possi-
bilities, where we add two extra dummies to the baseline regression equation (1): one is
unity for the T years just before the establishment of a NRTP, while the other is unity for
the T years just before its withdrawal, with T = 1, ..., 5 varying across specifications. The
“Pre-Trend” dummy captures changes in trade levels that could explain future concession
of NRTPs. The “Last Years” dummy captures what happens to trade levels just before
NRTPs are withdrawn.26
The NRTP estimates are very stable across the different specifications, as are the WTO
and PTA estimates. Meanwhile, there is no evidence of pre-trends and no special change
in the pattern of bilateral trade flows just before concessions are withdrawn. We interpret
those results as suggestive that changes in trade flows are not key determinants of the
decision to offer or remove NRTPs.
4.2 Heterogeneous Effects
There is significant heterogeneity hidden behind the general denomination of nonreciprocal
trade arrangements. We start to investigate this in Table 4.
First (columns 1 to 3), we interact the NRTP and PTA indicators with the WTO
26Table A2 in the Appendix has the complete set of results, including an OLS specification.
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Figure 3: Pre-Trends and Last Years
dummy to see whether the absence of a robust NRTP effect hinges on participation in the
WTO. Results show that the NRTP trade effect is actually positive and highly significant
for non-WTO members (first row of the table, columns 1-3). At the bottom of Table 4 we
then compute the effect of NRTP preferences when the pair of countries are already WTO
members. The results follow the same pattern of the benchmark regression: no sign that
NRTPs foster beneficiaries’ exports. Hence, the estimates in regressions 1-3 suggest that
nonreciprocal preferences may be redundant if a country already enjoys MFN treatment
and other benefits of WTO membership.27
27Another interesting result in columns 1-3 is the strongly negative interaction between WTO and PTA
memberships in the PPML specifications (although not in the OLS specification), suggesting substitutabil-
ity between those two types of trade agreements. It suggests that, once countries have secured access to
each other’s markets under MFN tariffs, PTA preferences become less effective in stimulating trade. This
result mirrors a finding by Liu (2016) about the growth effects of PTAs.
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Table 4: WTO and LDCs
WTO LDCs
OLS PPML† PPML OLS PPML† PPML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NRTP 0.104** 0.214*** 0.186*** 0.010 -0.016 -0.059***
(0.042) (0.040) (0.040) (0.028) (0.020) (0.019)
NRTP×WTO -0.025 -0.278*** -0.289***
(0.043) (0.047) (0.047)
NRTP×LDC 0.281*** 0.420*** 0.528***
(0.050) (0.055) (0.060)
WTO 0.096** 0.266*** 0.238*** 0.098** 0.189** 0.162**
(0.040) (0.082) (0.082) (0.040) (0.079) (0.079)
WTO×LDC 0.113 0.469*** 0.492***
(0.079) (0.123) (0.131)
PTA 0.418*** 0.600*** 0.552*** 0.513*** 0.397*** 0.383***
(0.047) (0.034) (0.036) (0.027) (0.021) (0.020)
PTA×WTO 0.100** -0.237*** -0.197***
(0.049) (0.035) (0.036)
PTA×LDC -0.160* 0.021 0.130
(0.083) (0.132) (0.141)
NRTPs for WTO members
NRTP + NRTP×WTO 0.079*** -0.064*** -0.104***
(0.029) (0.022) (0.022)
NRTPs for LDCs
NRTP + NRTP×LDC 0.291*** 0.405*** 0.469***
(0.049) (0.054) (0.058)
Observations 852,052 852,052 1,431,430 852,052 852,052 1,431,430
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively. † : PPML regression with same sample used in OLS regression.
All regressions include importer and exporter time-varying country fixed effects and symmetric
country-pair fixed effects. Standard errors are symmetrically clustered by country-pairs.
Second (columns 4 to 6), we interact the trade agreement variables with an LDC-
exporter indicator to investigate heterogeneities within and across trade arrangements.
Observe that the LDC-NRTP interaction captures not only the differential impact of gen-
eral arrangements like the GSP on very poor economies, but also the effects of more
generous sub-arrangements designed specifically for them. The estimates reveal that the
19
effects of NRTPs for non-LDC beneficiaries are indeed small (and unstable across specifi-
cations). We compute the trade effects for LDC exporters at the bottom of Table 4. For
them, NRTPs boost trade strongly, with estimates that are statistically significant and
stable across specifications. We also observe larger effects for WTO membership for LDCs
in the PPML regressions.
The results in Table 4 therefore suggest that NRTPs have substantial positive effects
on the exports of countries that are either outsiders in the world trading system or among
the world’s most impoverished nations. In Table 5 we then explore the interplay of those
two findings by allowing for simultaneous interactions of the NRTP and PTA variables
with an LDC-exporter indicator and the WTO dummy.
The results show that the picture portrayed in Table 4 is incomplete. Table 5 reveals
that NRTPs are especially effective in promoting the exports of beneficiaries when they
are LDCs who are already WTO members, as the last row of the table indicates. That
is, the strong NRTP effect for LDCs in Table 4 is driven largely by LDCs that belong
to the WTO. NRTPs are also effective (although not as much) in boosting foreign sales
of beneficiary countries that are not LDCs but remain at the fringes of the multilateral
trading system, as the first row of the table indicates. That is, the strong NRTP effect for
WTO nonmembers in Table 4 is driven mainly by not-so-poor developing countries.
Hence, our findings reveal that participation in the multilateral trading system matters
for the effectiveness of nonreciprocal preferences, and does so differently depending on
the degree of development of the beneficiary country. Without a structural model to
provide precise meaning to our estimates, any interpretation is necessarily tentative. But
a possibility is that very poor economies may not have the capabilities to re-allocate their
resources in order to take advantage of tariff preferences in advanced markets. As WTO
accession requires some degree of economic reforms that induce fragile economies to use
their economic resources more efficiently, WTO membership could provide such countries
the means to benefit from NRTPs. Indeed, in the next subsection we provide suggestive
evidence that ‘institutional quality,’ broadly defined, may be the key to explain why NRTPs
help LDCs to export only when they join the WTO.28
28On a similar point, note that, in the absence of NRTPs and PTAs, WTO membership promotes trade
for all counties, but does so much more strongly for LDCs, presumably because of the economic reforms
associated with WTO accession.
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Table 5: WTO and LDC Interactions
OLS PPML† PPML
(1) (2) (3)
NRTP 0.054 0.209*** 0.178***
(0.046) (0.042) (0.041)
NRTP×LDC 0.181** -0.130 -0.017
(0.087) (0.088) (0.094)
NRTP×WTO -0.051 -0.300*** -0.312***
(0.047) (0.049) (0.050)
NRTP×LDC×WTO 0.134 0.721*** 0.706***
(0.099) (0.108) (0.116)
WTO 0.097** 0.266*** 0.238***
(0.040) (0.082) (0.082)
WTO×LDC 0.106 0.332*** 0.381***
(0.081) (0.127) (0.136)
PTA 0.428*** 0.597*** 0.546***
(0.050) (0.034) (0.037)
PTA×LDC -0.067 0.234** 0.340**
(0.140) (0.106) (0.160)
PTA×WTO 0.107** -0.234*** -0.194***
(0.052) (0.035) (0.037)
PTA×WTO×LDC -0.115 -0.159 -0.181
(0.159) (0.184) (0.212)
NRTPs for LDC WTO nonmembers
NRTP + NRTP×LDC 0.234*** 0.079 0.161*
(0.079) (0.079) (0.086)
NRTPs for non-LDC WTO members
NRTP + NRTP×WTO 0.002 -0.090*** -0.133***
(0.030) (0.022) (0.022)
NRTPs for LDC WTO members
(NRTP + NRTP×LDC + NRTP×WTO 0.317*** 0.501*** 0.556***
+ NRTP× LDC×WTO) (0.056) (0.063) (0.070)
Observations 852,052 852,052 1,431,430
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively. † : PPML regression with same sample used in OLS regression.
All regressions include importer and exporter time-varying country fixed effects and symmetric
country-pair fixed effects. Standard errors are symmetrically clustered by country-pairs.
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Conversely, that distinction is not as important for non-LDC developing countries.
With the focus of NRTPs on (often limited and insecure) tariff reductions, nonreciprocal
preferential access to larger markets are useful for them while they face the possibility
of higher-than-MFN tariffs, but no longer once they become members of the WTO and
obtain permanent access to developed markets through their relatively low MFN rates.
4.3 Robustness and Extensions
In this subsection, we evaluate several robustness checks and extensions of our main analy-
sis. Specifically, we consider: (1) whether programs that offer wider and deeper preferential
access than GSP are the main drivers of our results; (2) whether our findings hinge on the
definition of WTO membership including de facto association; (3) whether the results re-
flect specific periods of our sample or apply more generally; (4) the factors that could help
rationalize the heterogeneous results for LDCs; (5) additional robustness checks.
4.3.1 Better-than-GSP Arrangements
The main system of nonreciprocal preferences worldwide is GSP, but several countries offer
other programs that provide better market access than GSP to specific groups of countries.
It is therefore possible that the differential NRTP trade effects across types of countries
reflect simply the different scope of preferences across them.
To investigate the effects of NRTPs that offer better market access than GSP, we
construct a BetterThanGSP indicator to identify the pairs of countries for which such
preferences exist. Observe that BetterThanGSPmxt = 1 implies NRTPmxt = 1, but the
reverse is not true. Hence, one should interpret the BetterThanGSP coefficient as the effect
of enjoying better preferential access relative to GSP. We add the BetterThanGSP dummy
and its interactions with the WTO and LDC indicators to the specification of Table 5.
Table 6 shows the total effects.29 The NRTP trade effects are qualitatively unchanged:
they boost exports of non-LDC WTO nonmembers and especially of LDCs that are WTO
members. Moreover, both effects are larger under better-than-GSP preferences, particu-
larly so for LDC WTO members. Those additional effects are sensible, since better-than-
GSP programs are designed for that purpose. For the other two sets of countries, non-LDC
WTO members and LDC WTO nonmembers, there is no clear evidence of positive trade
effects.
29Table A3 in the Appendix shows the complete set of results for the OLS and PPML specifications.
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Table 6: NRTPs, Better-than-GSP, LDCs and WTO membership
OLS PPML† PPML
(1) (2) (3)
NRTPs for non-LDC WTO nonmembersa 0.040 0.179*** 0.210***
(0.047) (0.041) (0.042)
NRTPs for LDC WTO nonmembersb 0.229*** 0.082 0.142
(0.081) (0.157) (0.151)
NRTPs for non-LDC WTO membersc 0.017 -0.081*** -0.123***
(0.031) (0.023) (0.022)
NRTPs for LDC WTO membersd 0.383*** 0.388*** 0.532***
(0.062) (0.085) (0.088)
Better-than-GSP scheme for non-LDC WTO nonmemberse 0.466*** 0.417* 0.394*
(0.163) (0.226) (0.239)
Better-than-GSP scheme for LDC WTO nonmembersf 0.237** 0.075 0.168
(0.111) (0.100) (0.111)
Better-than-GSP scheme for non-LDC WTO membersg -0.130** -0.253*** -0.197***
(0.065) (0.061) (0.058)
Better-than-GSP scheme for LDC WTO membersh 0.258*** 0.519*** 0.560***
(0.069) (0.067) (0.076)
Observations 852,052 852,052 1,431,430
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include importer and exporter time-varying
country fixed effects and symmetric country-pair fixed effects. Standard errors are symmetrically
clustered by country-pairs. †PPML regression with same sample used in OLS regression.
Total effects are given by the sum of the estimates of the following coefficients: a: NRTP;
b: NRTP+NRTP*LDC; c: NRTP+NRTP*WTO; d: NRTP+NRTP*LDC+ NRTP*WTO
+NRTP*LDC*WTO; e: NRTP+BetterthanGSP; f: NRTP+NRTP*LDC+BetterthanGSP+
BetterthanGSP*LDC; g: NRTP+NRTP*WTO+BetterthanGSP + BetterthanGSP*WTO;
h: NRTP+NRTP*LDC*WTO+NRTP*WTO+NRTP*LDC+BetterthanGSP+
BetterthanGSP*LDC+BetterthanGSP*WTO+BetterthanGSP*LDC*WTO.
Hence, this analysis shows that larger/wider preferential access tends to boost the
export impact of ‘regular’ NRTPs. However, the extra gains remain restricted to the
groups of countries that already benefit from the regular NRTPs—non-LDC outside the
WTO and, especially, LDCs that are WTO members.
4.3.2 WTO Formal Membership
As pointed out in section 2, following Tomz et al.’a (2007a), we use a definition for WTO
membership that encompasses de jure, colonial, de facto and provisional members. Such
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a distinction affects chiefly developing economies, which are the beneficiaries of NRTPs.
Hence, while Tomz et al.’s seems the most appropriate definition in our context, we should
examine whether it is the main driver of our results.
Accordingly, we run the same set of regressions as in Table 5, but changing the defi-
nition of the WTO variable. Now, WTOmxt is unity only when m and x are both formal
members of the WTO. This definition comprises original/founding members of the GATT,
countries that joined the GATT through Articles XXXIII and XXVI:5(c), and those that
joined the WTO. As the results in Table 7 show, the trade effects of NRTPs are virtually
unchanged when we use the formal definition of WTO membership: NRTPs promote ex-
ports of beneficiaries either when they are LDCs within the WTO or non-LDCs outside
the WTO, but not otherwise.30
4.3.3 Heterogeneous Effects Over Time
As observed in Table 2, developing countries’ entries and exits in lists of NRTP beneficiaries
are not spread evenly over time. Moreover, the value of preferences may also vary with
time. In fact, trade between NRTP partners was relatively more important in the 1970’s
and 1980’s (Figure 1). A concern is that our findings may be restricted to a specific period.
To investigate that possibility, we decompose the heterogeneous average trade effects
related to LDCs and WTO membership into different decades. We use the specification in
Table 5, but further interacting the NRTP, WTO and LDC variables with indicators for
different decades (1970’s to the 2000’s). Figure 4 plots coefficients, 99% and 95% confidence
intervals from a PPML regression for the total effect for each subset of countries.31 Overall,
the results point to a decrease in the trade impact of nonreciprocal preferences over time.
Part of the reason may be the level of MFN rates, which were significantly higher in
the 1970’s and 1980’s than they are more recently. As preferential margins have fallen,
their impact may have fallen accordingly. That general trend notwithstanding, there are
important distinctions in each group.
30There is one interesting difference between the results of tables 5 and 7. Using the formal definition of
membership, in the absence of NRTPs and PTAs, WTO membership has no clear effect on trade volumes,
except for LDCs. This illustrates the point made by Tomz et al. (2007a) that accounting for de facto
membership is critical for estimating the WTO trade effect.
31Diamonds are point estimates, the horizontal lines delimit 99% confidence intervals, and the shorter
segments define 95% confidence intervals. As in Table 2, the indicator for the 2000’s comprehends years
between 2000 until 2015. Base levels refer to years before 1970. As in Table 5, the total effect for each
subset of countries sums over all the corresponding interactions, but they are now split by decades.
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Table 7: WTO and LDC Interactions: WTO Formal Membership
OLS PPML† PPML
(1) (2) (3)
NRTP -0.038 0.242*** 0.208***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.043)
NRTP×LDC 0.210*** -0.186** -0.073
(0.080) (0.086) (0.092)
NRTP×WTO 0.064 -0.324*** -0.335***
(0.044) (0.052) (0.052)
NRTP×LDC×WTO 0.105 0.787*** 0.781***
(0.094) (0.109) (0.118)
WTO 0.036 0.151** 0.122
(0.037) (0.077) (0.077)
WTO×LDC 0.126 0.461*** 0.493***
(0.082) (0.129) (0.138)
PTA 0.301*** 0.675*** 0.607***
(0.065) (0.040) (0.042)
PTA×LDC -0.210 -0.002 0.127
(0.154) (0.110) (0.177)
PTA×WTO 0.241*** -0.303*** -0.247***
(0.064) (0.040) (0.041)
PTA×WTO×LDC 0.111 0.097 0.061
(0.174) (0.183) (0.220)
NRTPs for LDC WTO nonmembers
NRTP + NRTP×LDC 0.172** 0.056 0.135
(0.074) (0.076) (0.083)
NRTPs for non-LDC WTO members
NRTP + NRTP×WTO 0.025 -0.082*** -0.127***
(0.030) (0.023) (0.022)
NRTPs for LDC WTO members
(NRTP + NRTP×LDC + NRTP×WTO 0.340*** 0.519*** 0.580***
+ NRTP× LDC×WTO) (0.057) (0.064) (0.072)
Observations 852,052 852,052 1,431,430
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively. † : PPML regression with same sample used in OLS regression.
All regressions include importer and exporter time-varying country fixed effects and symmetric
country-pair fixed effects. Standard errors are symmetrically clustered by country-pairs.
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Figure 4: Heterogeneous Eects Over Time
Among LDCs, the trade effect for WTO members is positive and significant for all peri-
ods, even though the magnitude of the point estimates declines slightly over time. On the
other hand, the effect for LDCs that are not WTO members is small and never statistically
different from zero. This shows that our conclusions about the interplay between NRTPs
and WTO membership for LDCs are not contingent on any specific period.
For non-LDCs, results are more erratic. The estimates for WTO members indicate a
clear decline of the impact of NRTPs over time. Among WTO nonmembers, the NRTP
trade effects resonate with those of members in the 1970’s and 1980’s, but diverge in later
years. Specifically, in the 2000’s we observe a positive and statistically significant effect for
WTO nonmembers, but the inverse for WTO members. This could reflect the fact that
MFN tariff levels have decreased considerably in that period, so the value of NRTPs fell for
those in the WTO enjoying MFN access to developed markets. Absent WTO membership,
however, NRTPs remained a valuable way to access those markets.
Overall, the disaggregation of trade effects by decade confirms that the trade effect of
NRTPs is heterogeneous over time. That heterogeneity indicates that the trade impact of
NRTPs for non-LDCs tend to be context-specific. On the other hand, our previous results
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for LDCs are valid throughout the whole period of analysis: NRTPs help the exports of
LDCs considerably, but only if they are WTO members.
4.3.4 Disentangling the NRTP Trade Effect for LDCs
The finding that NRTPs promote the exports of LDCs only if they are members of the
WTO is somewhat puzzling, since the NRTP margin of preference tends to be larger if the
beneficiary country is not in the WTO. We have argued that this may reflect reforms that
are either induced by or a pre-condition for WTO entry, or reflect other institutional and
economic characteristics that correlate with WTO membership. Here we offer a first look
at what those factors may be.
To avoid a proliferation of interaction terms, we restrict the sample to LDC exporters.
We then interact the NRTP and NRTP*WTO variables with a dummy that indicates
that the country is in the ‘top’ third of the ranking of characteristic X, where X represents
one of following variables: (1) GDP per capita; (2) a democracy index, to proxy for
institutional quality;32 (3) the share of iron and steel production in GDP, to proxy for
comparative advantage in manufacturing goods; and (4) national consumption of primary
energy divided by GDP, to proxy for the level of economic activity more broadly. The
last two variables are components of what forms the Correlates of War’s index of National
Material Capabilities (Singer et al., 1972). The bottom of Table 8 describes the data
sources for each variable.
Table 8 shows the total effect for each group of LDCs in the PPML estimation. For
WTO nonmembers, the trade effect of NRTPs is always statistically indistinguishable from
zero. For WTO members, the distinction by GDP per capita makes no difference, but a
higher level of each of the other three variables is associated with a larger NRTP effect (a
greater importance of iron and steel in the economy is only marginally significant, though).
The results thus indicate that broader national capabilities and stronger institutions
may play a central role in explaining why WTO membership increases the effectiveness of
nonreciprocal preferences for LDCs. This is, however, just a first look at the characteris-
tics that lie behind the mechanisms through which this happens, and further research is
certainly needed to improve our understanding of those channels.
32Ideally, we would like to use a variable describing the rule of law to proxy for the quality of institutions
in a country. However, the time spans of existing indexes are restricted to more recent years.
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Table 8: NRTP effects among LDCs by national traits
GDP Democracy Iron and Steel Energy
Per Capita Index Production Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-WTO member (low X) -0.050 -0.128 -0.070 -0.057
(0.171) (0.202) (0.196) (0.207)
Non-WTO member (high X) -0.084 0.354 0.155 -0.230
(0.234) (0.257) (0.314) (0.209)
WTO member (low X) 0.229 0.136 0.194 0.168
(0.150) (0.184) (0.178) (0.179)
WTO member (high X) 0.189 0.329* 0.297 0.414**
(0.189) (0.171) (0.185) (0.183)
Observations 196,782 196,782 196,782 196,782
Notes: In column 1, X is GDP Per Capita; in column 2, a democracy index; in column 3,
production of iron and steel divided by GDP; in column 4, national consumption of primary
energy divided by GDP. GDP and GDP per capita are from the World Bank. Production
of iron and steel and consumption of primary energy are from the Correlates of War’s
National Material Capabilities database version 5.0 (Singer et al., 1972). The democracy
index is from the Polity IV project (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html).
4.3.5 Additional Robustness Checks
Different definition for PTAs We aggregate all PTAs (i.e., trade agreements coded
2 to 6 in the Baier-Bergstrand database) into a single dummy. We use that concise def-
inition for PTAs because our focus is on the NRTP trade effect. However, following a
large literature that seeks to distinguish the trade effects of different types of PTAs (for
example, Baier et al., 2014), we re-run our main specification differentiating across types of
PTAs. We find that our key results regarding the NRTP trade effect remain qualitatively
unchanged. We do not include the results for brevity, but they are available upon request.
Aggregating data at different time intervals We use data at the year level, as they
are collected. As we argued in section 2, we think this is the appropriate approach in
our context. But other authors aggregate data at longer time periods—three, four or five
years. The main justification is that a single year may not be enough for a full adjustment
to a trade agreement. Accordingly, we re-run our main specification aggregating the data
at longer time horizons. Again, our main results regarding the NRTP trade effect remain
qualitatively unchanged. We do not include the results for brevity, but they are available
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upon request.
5 Conclusion
We estimate the aggregate effects of nonreciprocal trade preferences on exports of benefi-
ciary countries. Such preferences have been offered systematically by developed economies
to developing ones since the 1970s. Yet to this point we do not know even whether they
achieve their most basic purpose of promoting exports of developing countries.
The reason for the existing ambiguity in the literature is three-fold. First, some method-
ological approaches were not suitable for the analysis. Second, the NRTP data used in some
studies were incomplete and sometimes faulty. Third, previous analyses have overlooked
heterogeneity in the effects of NRTPs.
Here, we carry out a simple but theoretically consistent gravity analysis of NRTPs using
a complete, well-documented dataset. Looking at average effects, little can be concluded
about the effectiveness of the preferences. However, once one allows for heterogeneity
regarding the level of development of the country and its membership in the World Trade
Organization, the picture becomes much clearer.
Nonreciprocal preferences boost exports of the Least Developed Countries, but only if
they are members of the WTO. They also promote foreign sales of non-LDCs, but only if
they are not members of the WTO. Those results are fairly robust and are not driven by
the deeper and wider preferences that LDCs receive in some arrangements (although the
effects are stronger in that case). They point to a nuanced relationship between preferential
and multilateral liberalization that depends on the country’s level of development. In
particular, the results suggest that nonreciprocal preferential access can help very poor
countries access the markets of rich economies, but participation in the multilateral trading
system is a pre-condition for that.
More generally, this paper helps to settle some issues in the literature while hinting at
several new avenues for further research. It stresses that the results of nonreciprocal prefer-
ences are heterogeneous. On the empirical side, we explore some margins of heterogeneity,
but many others are possible, some of which are motivated directly by our analysis. For
example, it would be interesting to investigate whether the NRTP effect varies with the
type of exit of an agreement (that is, when the country is removed/‘graduates’ vis-a`-vis
when it forms a PTA with the donor nation); to evaluate whether the NRTP effect varies
with the preference-granting country (the effect may be heterogeneous simply because the
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depth and width of preferences vary, but do more fundamental characteristics of the donor
country also matter?); and to explore further the heterogeneity of the effect over time
(since many characteristics of the world trading system have changed over the decades).
On the theoretical side, we have argued that the heterogeneous result for non-LDCs
probably reflects different margins of preferences that hinge on WTO membership, whereas
the heterogeneous result for LDCs seems to reveal institutional characteristics related to
(or perhaps induced by) WTO membership. However, here we only speculate about the
possible reasons behind our empirical results. Ultimately, they reveal that we need more
theoretical work to better guide the empirical analysis so we can more fully understand
the implications of nonreciprocal preferences.
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6 Appendix
6.1 List of Better-than-GSP Arrangements
Table A1: Better-than-GSP Schemes
Donor Program Starting Year
Australia South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement 1981
Australia Generalized System of Preferences (LDC Subscheme) 2003
Canada Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff 1986
Canada Generalized System of Preferences (LDC Subscheme) 2001
Chile Duty-free treatment for LDCs 2014
China Duty-free treatment for LDCs 2010
E.U. GSP+ 2005
E.U. Trade preferences for countries of the Western Balkans 2001
E.U. Everything but Arms 2001
E.U. Trade preferences for Pakistan 2013
Iceland Generalized System of Preferences (LDC-Specific Scheme) 2002
India Duty-Free Tariff Preference Scheme for LDCs 2008
Japan Generalized System of Preferences (LDC Subscheme) 2001
Kazakhstan Generalized System of Preferences (LDC Subscheme) 2011
Korea Preferential Tariff for LDCs 2008
Kyrgyzstan Duty-free treatment for LDCs 2006
Morocco Duty-free treatment for African LDCs 2001
New Zealand South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement 1981
New Zealand Generalized System of Preferences (LDC Subscheme) 2001
Norway† Generalized System of Preferences 2002
Switzerland Generalized System of Preferences (LDC Subscheme) 1997
Taiwan Duty-Free Treatment for LDCs 2004
Thailand Duty-Free Tariff Preference Scheme for LDCs 2015
Turkey Generalized System of Preferences (LDC Subscheme) 2002
U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (LDC Subscheme) 1996
U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act 2001
U.S. Caribbean Basin Initiative 2007
Notes: † Norway’s GSP-LDC scheme was expanded in 2008 and includes 14 non-LDC low-income countries.
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6.2 Additional Results
Table A2: Pre-Trends and Last Years
T=1 T=2 T=3 T=4 T=5
OLS PPML OLS PPML OLS PPML OLS PPML OLS PPML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
NRTP 0.083*** -0.035* 0.087*** -0.035* 0.090*** -0.037* 0.095*** -0.036* 0.102*** -0.036*
(0.028) (0.019) (0.029) (0.020) (0.030) (0.020) (0.030) (0.021) (0.031) (0.021)
NRTP Pre Trend 0.013 0.038 0.014 0.031 0.022 0.022 0.037 0.020 0.054* 0.004
(0.035) (0.043) (0.032) (0.042) (0.032) (0.043) (0.032) (0.044) (0.032) (0.045)
NRTP Last Years -0.043 0.024 -0.090** 0.022 -0.073** 0.022 -0.072** 0.016 -0.085** 0.009
(0.041) (0.030) (0.038) (0.029) (0.036) (0.030) (0.035) (0.031) (0.034) (0.031)
WTO 0.098** 0.165** 0.098** 0.165** 0.098** 0.165** 0.098** 0.165** 0.098** 0.165**
(0.040) (0.079) (0.040) (0.079) (0.040) (0.079) (0.040) (0.079) (0.040) (0.079)
PTA 0.496*** 0.387*** 0.495*** 0.387*** 0.495*** 0.387*** 0.495*** 0.387*** 0.495*** 0.386***
(0.026) (0.020) (0.026) (0.020) (0.026) (0.020) (0.026) (0.020) (0.026) (0.020)
Observations 852,052 1,431,430 852,052 1,431,430 852,052 1,431,430 852,052 1,431,430 852,052 1,431,430
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
All regressions include importer and exporter time-varying country fixed effects and symmetric country-pair fixed effects.
Standard errors are symmetrically clustered by country-pairs.
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Table A3: NRTPs, Better-than-GSP, LDCs and WTO membership
OLS PPML† PPML
(1) (2) (3)
NRTP 0.040 0.210*** 0.179***
(0.047) (0.042) (0.041)
NRTP×LDC 0.190** -0.128 -0.037
(0.088) (0.161) (0.155)
NRTP×WTO -0.022 -0.290*** -0.302***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.050)
NRTP×LDC×WTO 0.176* 0.597*** 0.692***
(0.104) (0.184) (0.178)
BetterThanGSP 0.426** 0.207 0.215
(0.166) (0.226) (0.239)
BetterThanGSP×LDC -0.419** -0.215 -0.189
(0.196) (0.303) (0.313)
BetterThanGSP×WTO -0.574*** -0.324 -0.345
(0.173) (0.233) (0.247)
BetterThanGSP×LDC×WTO 0.441** 0.462 0.347
(0.210) (0.320) (0.329)
WTO 0.095** 0.266*** 0.237***
(0.040) (0.082) (0.082)
WTO×LDC 0.100 0.365*** 0.386***
(0.081) (0.125) (0.136)
PTA 0.429*** 0.597*** 0.547***
(0.050) (0.034) (0.037)
PTA×LDC -0.070 0.234** 0.345**
(0.141) (0.103) (0.157)
PTA×WTO 0.104** -0.235*** -0.195***
(0.052) (0.035) (0.037)
PTA×WTO×LDC -0.121 -0.148 -0.182
(0.160) (0.181) (0.210)
Observations 852,052 852,052 1,431,430
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include importer and exporter time-
varying country fixed effects and symmetric country-pair fixed effects. Standard errors
are symmetrically by clustered by country-pairs. †PPML regression with same sample
used in OLS regression.
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6.3 Changes in Policy Variables
Here we make a more detailed assessment of the changes in the main explanatory variables.
We focus on changes of NRTP status and on overall entries and exits among LDC exporters.
As in the main text, we document changes in preferences following variable definitions in
section 2. Naturally, an abundance of individual reasons drives countries in their trade
policy decisions. Nonetheless, there are general, detectable patterns in the country-pair-
time variations. We detail them below.
In Table A4 we discriminate between the reasons why the NRTP variable drops from
1 to 0. There are two possibilities: either preferences are suspended and beneficiaries lose
their preferential tariffs,33 or countries form a PTA embracing reciprocal liberalization.34
Observe that, except for the 1980’s, NRTP exits due to PTA formation have outnumbered
the pure NRTP suspensions. This suggests that NRTPs and PTAs are not necessarily
mutually exclusive trade policy alternatives. Instead, nonreciprocal liberalization may be
the first stage in a sequential process of trade integration between developing and developed
economies.
Table A4: Exits from NRTPs
Decade PTA formation NRTP suspension
1950’s 0 0
1960’s 0 0
1970’s 46 4
1980’s 15 137
1990’s 125 100
2000’s 1,245 851
In Table A5 we show how NRTP entries and exits vary between members and nonmem-
bers of the WTO. As about every country extending nonreciprocal preferences is also a
WTO member,35 Table A5 refers exclusively to the WTO status of the beneficiary country.
Notice that the number of new preferential arrangements for nonmembers peaked in the
2000’s, even though WTO memberships has grown over time, with just a few countries
outside the organization nowadays. Furthermore, exits exceeded entries for WTO members
in the 2000’s, while the reverse happened among nonmembers. All in all, the table shows
that concession of nonreciprocal preferences to countries excluded from the world trading
33Absent PTA formation, the end of NRTPs is usually given by graduation, but countries may also lose
eligibility when failing to fulfill some general pre-conditions established by preference-granting countries,
like the existence of political pluralism and the rule of law.
34Notice that the sum of columns “PTA formation” and “NRTP suspension” equals the column
“NRTP/exit” from Table 1 in the main text.
35There are a few exceptions, like Russia offering NRTPs to Afghanistan since 1994, even though it
became a WTO member only in 2011.
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system represents a growing share of overall NRTPs. This general trend is consistent with
movements like the recent reform of the European GSP and new nonreciprocal schemes
that are exclusive for least developed nations.
Table A5: Changes in NRTPs by WTO affiliation
Decade WTO mbr. WTO non-mbr.
Entry Exit Entry Exit
1950’s 1 0 0 0
1960’s 121 0 8 0
1970’s 1,579 30 657 20
1980’s 440 130 139 22
1990’s 176 166 346 59
2000’s 1,419 1,741 1057 355
In Table A6 we reproduce Table 1 but only when exporters are LDCs. The table
portrays LDCs as longtime active members of the international trading system, notwith-
standing their political and economic frailties. However, NRTP, WTO and PTA entries
are more numerous in the 2000’s.36 Remarkably, preferences for LDCs in the 2000’s were
extended mainly through NRTPs, not PTAs. This is very different from what we observe
in Table 1, and underscores NRTPs as the main form of trade integration for LDCs.
Table A6: Changes in main variables; LDC exporters
Decade NRTP WTO PTA
Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit
1970’s 355 0 48 9 66 0
1980’s 126 28 116 0 106 0
1990’s 109 18 657 803 184 75
2000’s 1,068 343 1,169 0 448 27
Finally, Table A7 splits NRTP entries and exits among LDCs according to WTO mem-
bership. Variations across time follow a similar pattern among members and nonmembers.
One exception is NRTP exits in the 2000’s, which soared among WTO members but re-
mained virtually absent for nonmembers. This is unfortunate, since our results show that
NRTPs are most effective precisely for LDCs who are WTO members—and may hint at
political economy forces behind the withdrawal of nonreciprocal preferences.
Table A7: Changes in NRTPs among LDCs by WTO affiliation
Decade WTO mbr. WTO non-mbr.
Entry Exit Entry Exit
1970’s 228 0 127 0
1980’s 84 23 42 5
1990’s 67 4 42 14
2000’s 600 277 468 66
36Naturally, there are changes also in the list of LDCs. However, the majority of nations were included
in the 1970’s and new entries have only decreased with time.
37
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
1577 Matthew Ridlay 
Camille Terrier 
Fiscal and Education Spillovers from Charter 
School Expansion 
1576 John Van Reenen Increasing Differences Between Firms: Market 
Power and the Macro-Economy 
1575 Margarida Madaleno 
Max Nathan 
Henry Overman 
Sevrin Waights 
Incubators, Accelerators and Regional 
Economic Development 
1574 Esteban M. Aucejo 
Patrick Coate 
Jane Cooley Fruehwirth, 
Sean Kelly 
Zachary Mozenter 
Teacher Effectiveness and Classroom 
Composition 
1573 Stephan Heblich 
Stephen J. Redding 
Daniel M. Sturm 
The Making of the Modern Metropolis: 
Evidence from London 
1572 Johannes Beohm 
Ezra Oberfield 
Misallocation in the Market for Inputs: 
Enforcement and the Organization of 
Production 
1571 Hans R. A. Koster 
Edward W. Pinchbeck 
How do Households Value the Future? 
Evidence from Property Taxes 
1570 Holger Breinlich 
Elsa Leromain 
Dennis Novy 
Thomas Sampson 
Ahmed Usman 
The Economic Effects of Brexit – Evidence 
From the Stock Market 
1569 J. Vernon Henderson 
Sebastian Kriticos 
Dzhamilya Nigmatulina 
Measuring Urban Economic Density 
1568 Philippe Bracke 
Silvana Tenreyro 
History Dependence in the Housing Market 
1567 Ester Faia 
Sebastien Laffitte 
Gianmarco Ottaviano 
Foreign Expansion, Competition and Bank 
Risk 
1566 Brian Bell 
Rui Costa 
Stephen Machin 
Why Does Education Reduce Crime? 
1565 Richard Murphy 
Felix Weinhardt 
Gill Wyness 
Who Teaches the Teachers? A RCT of Peer-
to-Peer Observation and Feedback in 181 
Schools 
1564 Paola Conconi 
Giovanni Facchini 
Max F. Steinhardt 
Maurizio Zanardi 
The Political Economy of Trade and 
Migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress 
1563 Stephen Gibbons 
Stephan Heblich 
Ted Pinchbeck 
The Spatial Impacts of a Massive Rail 
Disinvestment Program: The Beeching Axe 
1562 Helen Johnson 
Sandra McNally 
Heather Rolfe 
Jenifer Ruiz-Valenzuela, 
Robert Savage 
Janet Vousden 
Clare Wood 
Teaching Assistants, Computers and 
Classroom Management: Evidence from a 
Randomised Control Trial 
1561 Daniel J. Graham 
Stephen Gibbons 
 
Quantifying Wide Economic Impacts of 
Agglomeration for Transport Appraisal: 
Existing Evidence and Future Directions 
1560 Daniel S. Jacks 
Dennis Novy 
Market Potential and Global Growth over the 
Long Twentieth Century 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7955 7673 Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Website: http://cep.lse.ac.uk Twitter: @CEP_LSE 
